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THE INJUSTICE OF IMPOSING DEATH
SENTENCES ON PEOPLE WITH SEVERE MENTAL
ILLNESSES
Ronald S. Honberg"
I wanted to approach this issue in a different way and explain why we
believe that it is so grievously inappropriate to execute people with
mental illnesses, particularly people with severe mental illnesses. There
are hundreds of people with schizophrenia and other severe mental
illnesses on death row around the country.' If you look at these cases,
you recognize that there frequently are major problems in the way the
cases were handled, in the way mental illness was presented to judges or
juries, and in the way the impact of mental illness on criminal culpability
was evaluated.2 Although there is today increasing public concern about
whether the death penalty is administered fairly, relatively few concerns
have been raised about the potential impact of mental illnesses on the
fairness of the court proceedings in capital cases. Since this is an area
where the potential for error is compounded, I want to make the case
that the existence of a severe mental illness should be per se a mitigating
factor in capital cases.
I want to start by putting a little bit of a face on capital defendants with
severe mental illnesses, because when we hear about capital cases we
assume that the defendants are monsters-just people with no redeeming
social value. I have had the chance to be fairly involved in some of these
cases over the years, and I have gotten to know the families and a little
This article was originally delivered as remarks at the Catholic University Law Review
Symposium on the Death Penalty and Mental Illness, held on January 26, 2005.
+J.D., M.Ed. Ronald S. Honberg is the National Director for Policy and Legal Affairs at
the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAM]). Mr. Honberg also serves on the Task
Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty convened by the American Bar
Association's Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities. The author gratefully
acknowledges the talented group of editors and staff members of the Catholic University
Law Review for their contributions to this article.
1. See Rhonda K. Jenkins, Comment, Fit To Die: Drug-Induced Competency for the
Purpose of Execution, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 149, 149 (1995).
2. See Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill CriminalOffenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is
There Hope for a Just Jurisprudencein an Era of Responsibility/Consequences Talk?, 57
ARK. L. REV. 447, 530-31 (2004); Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face Is Always
Well-Hidden": The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 201, 225-27 (1996); Ronald J. Tabak, Striving To Eliminate Unjust
Executions: Why the ABA's Individual Rights & Responsibilities Section Has Issued
Protocols on Unfair Implementation of Capital Punishment, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 475, 486
(2002).
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bit of the histories of some individual defendants. I know that when it
comes to some defendants, certainly defendants with serious mental
illnesses on death row, they are not monsters.
The National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) is the leading
grassroots advocacy organization for people with severe mental illnesses
around the country NAMI's members are primarily people, or family
members of people, with severe mental illnesses. NAMI has about
220,000 members around the country, and affiliates in every state that are
very much involved in grassroots advocacy in their communities. Over
the years, the advocacy efforts of many of our members have become
focused on criminal justice systems as these systems have assumed more
and more responsibility for housing people with serious and persistent
mental illnesses.
On any given day, there are more than four times as many people with
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression in our nation's jails
and prisons as there are in hospitals.6 The Los Angeles County Jail, the
Cook County Jail in Chicago, and Riker's Island in New York all
incarcerate more people with mental illness on any given day than any
private or public psychiatric hospital in the country.7 Police departments
and police officers have become front line respondents to mentally ill
people in crisis in this country. Most individuals with severe mental
illnesses who become involved in the criminal justice system are
nonviolent criminals. Many have committed nonviolent crimes,9 or no

3. Mental Health in Children and Youth: Issues Throughout the Developmental
Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Substance Abuse and Mental Health Servs. of
the Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 108th Cong. 44 (2004) [hereinafter
Hearing](statement of Linda Champion, Member, National Alliance for the Mentally Ill).
4.

See

NAT'L

ALLIANCE

FOR THE

MENTALLY

ILL,

MISSION

STATEMENT,

http://www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/InformYourself/AboutNAMI/AboutNA
MI.htm (last visited May 15, 2005).
5. See Hearing,supra note 3, at 44.
6.

TREATMENT

ADVOCACY

CTR.,

CRIMINALIZATION

OF AMERICANS

WITH

SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESSES 1, available at http://www.psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/
Fact3.htm (last visited May 15, 2005).
7. E. Fuller Torrey, Reinventing Mental Health Care, CITY J., Autumn 1999,
http://www.city-journal.org/html/9-4-a5.html.
8.

TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR.,

LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND PEOPLE

WITH

SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESSES 1 (2005), available at http://www.psychlaws.org/Briefing
Papers/BP16.pdf; see also COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL
HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECr 34 (2002), available at http://www.consensusproject.org/
the-report/downloads.
9. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: ABOUT THE PROBLEM, available at http://www.consensusproject.org/

downloads/factabout-the-problem.pdf (last visited May 15, 2005).
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crime at all, but engaged in behaviors attributable to their illnesses that
attracted the attention of police.'
The science of treating people with severe mental illness has evolved,
and today there are psychosocial treatments, medications, and support
that work to alleviate the most profound symptoms of these illnesses."
However, very few people in this country access even minimal mental
health treatment; specifically, fewer than fifty percent of all people with
schizophrenia seek out such treatment." So it's really not surprising at a
time when there are no options for someone in psychiatric crisis that
some of these people end up in the criminal justice system. It is
important to put that into context, even though most people with mental
illnesses have not committed the kinds of violent crimes that would raise
questions or issues about the death penalty.
However, if you look at the death penalty cases that I have seen, you
will see that at some point in the defendant's history there was a
profound and desperate need for mental health treatment that was not
provided. Let me give you an example of a recent, highly publicized case
involving a defendant with a severe mental illness-a case where the
death penalty is potentially still at issue.
In 1998, in Washington, D.C., Russell "Rusty" Weston burst through a
security checkpoint in the U.S. Capitol and, after triggering a metal
detector, opened fire with a handgun he was carrying. 3 When all was
said and done, Weston had killed two Capitol police officers and
allegedly wounded a tourist."' This was a prominent national news story.
The story that was not told was what had happened with Mr. Weston
in the years prior to the shootings. This is a man who had a twenty-year
history of schizophrenia. He had grown up in southern Illinois on a

10. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 8, at 34.
11. NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NIH PUB. NO. 02-3929, MEDICATIONS 1-2 (4th ed. 2002), available at
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/NIMHmedicate.pdf.
12. NAT'I INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NIMH PUB. NO. 00-4500, SCHIZOPHRENIA RESEARCH (2000), available at
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/NIMHschizresfact.pdf.
13. See Michael Grunwald & Cheryl W. Thompson, Weston Charged with Murder in
Rampage, WASH. POST, July 26, 1998, at Al; Martin Weil, Gunman Shoots His Way into
Capitol; 2 Officers Killed, Injured Suspect Held, WASH. POST, July 25, 1998, at Al; see also

Elana H. Margolis, The Failureof Civil Confinement: How Russell E. Weston Jr. Slipped
Through the Cracks and the Potentialfor Many More To Follow, 26 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIv. CONFINEMENT 129,144 (2000).
14. Grunwald & Thompson, supra note 13.

15. See Bill Miller, CapitolSlaying Suspect to Undergo More Tests, WASH. POST, Jan.
29, 1999, at All [hereinafter Bill Miller, Capitol Slaying]; Bill Miller, Therapists To
Evaluate Suspect in Hill Killings, WASH. POST, July 31, 1998, at C5.
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rural farm, and at some point migrated to Montana.16 During this period,
Mr. Weston never engaged in any violent acts, but did engage in a series
of bizarre acts that attracted the attention of law enforcement. 17 He was
finally committed to the Montana state psychiatric hospital, where he
spent fifty-three days.' There, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia.' 9
Although medication alleviated some of the symptoms, he was still
20
severely disabled .
After fifty-three days, he was released from the state hospital, given a
month's supply of medication, and referred to the community mental
health center near his parents' home in southern Illinois. 2' No effort was
made to contact his family to let them know he was coming, let alone
what his diagnosis was or what his treatment needs were. 2 After his
initial visit, Weston never returned to the community mental health
center.23 His condition continued to deteriorate over the next two years2 4
His family became alarmed by his behavior, and unsuccessfully tried to
25
persuade him to take his medication.
S 26
Weston actually came to Washington, D.C. twice. First, he went to
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Headquarters wearing a suit and
looking quite convincing. 7 The CIA actually granted him an audience,
to whom he told a story about a Ruby Satellite System that he had
helped develop for the Federal Government 8 Weston believed that the
Ruby Satellite would protect the United States from cannibals and the
diseases they spawned. 9 He was there to tell the CIA about this because
it needed to do something about it.3° The agent interviewing Weston
quickly realized Weston was quite disoriented, and that his story was not

16. Margolis, supra note 13, at 142.
17. Michael Powell & Anita Huslin, Suspect Described As Loner, WASH. POST, July
25, 1998, at Al.
18. Margolis, supra note 13, at 143.
19. See Miller, CapitolSlaying, supra note 15.
20. Anne Hull, A Living Hell or a Life Saved?, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2001, at Al.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Parents Say Accused Shooter's Mind 'Worked Overtime', CNN.COM, July 27, 1998,
at http://www.cnn.com/us/9807/27/cap.shooting.weston.02.
26. Hull, supra note 20.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Erik Luna, Citing the Mind To Kill the Body, AM. PROSPECT ONLINE, May
15, 2001, at http://www.prospect.org/web/printfriendly-viewww?id=360.
30. See Hull, supranote 20.
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plausible." Mr. Weston left, came back to Washington, D.C.2 two years
later, burst into the Capitol with a gun, and the rest is history.
Mr. Weston has been in the Federal Correctional Institute in Butner,
North Carolina since May 1999."3 His mental capacity has never reached
the point where he has been found competent to stand trial.
Interestingly enough, the government has provided Weston with the
treatment he needs by obtaining orders to involuntarily medicate him in
an attempt to make him competent to stand trial.35 Even with that
treatment, he might not obtain sufficient stability so that he can be
brought to trial.36 Nevertheless, the government is not taking the death
penalty off the table.37 It has steadfastly insisted that it would like to
bring Weston to trial.38 While the government does not talk about the
death penalty, it has not ruled it out either.3 9 It is a distinct possibility in
this case that if Weston ever becomes competent to stand trial, which
may never happen, the government will seek the death penalty against
him.
Weston's case is not an aberration. Our nation's prisons are full of
individuals who committed crimes while highly delusional and
psychotic. 40 Despite the efforts of many learned jurists and leading
forensic psychiatrists and psychologists, we have never developed a
wholly satisfactory way of evaluating the impact of mental illness on
criminal culpability-nor have we developed a way to evaluate mental
illness when the illness, while perhaps not reaching the level of "insanity"

31.

See id.

32.

Id. For an excellent summary of the events leading up to Russell Weston's arrest,

see Aimee Feinberg, Note, Forcible Medication of Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants: The
Case of Russell Eugene Weston, Jr., 54 STAN. L. REV. 769, 769-70 (2002).
33. United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 117 (D.D.C.), affd, 255 F.3d 873
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Jennifer Yachnin, Judge Sends Weston to N.C. for Commitment
Proceedings,ROLL CALL (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 22, 2004, at 3.
34. See United States v. Weston, Crim. No. 98-357 (EGS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23579, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2004) (order extending involuntary medical treatment).
35. See Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 138. The court has granted subsequent motions
extending Weston's medication. See United States v. Weston, 211 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183

(D.D.C. 2002) (order extending involuntary medical treatment); United States v. Weston,
260 F. Supp. 2d 147, 155-56 (D.D.C. 2003) (order extending involuntary medical
treatment); United States v. Weston, 326 F. Supp. 2d 64, 68 (D.D.C. 2004) (order

extending involuntary medical treatment).
36. See Weston, Crim. No. 98-357 (EGS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23579, at *3 (order
extending involuntary medical treatment).
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Yachnin, supra note 33.
Id.
See id.
Cf supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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in a legal sense, should nevertheless be recognized as mitigating against
the death penalty.
Atkins v. Virginia41 is obviously very significant to this discussion
because it represents an attempt to develop a way to make these
evaluations in the context of mental retardation. In Atkins, the Supreme
Court struck down the death penalty, categorically, for defendants with
mental retardation.42 The Court cited characteristics of mental disorders
that act to diminish the capacities of defendants with mental retardation
to formulate criminal intent or to carry out criminal acts in cold-blooded,
calculating ways.43 In Atkins, the Court appeared concerned specifically
with two issues. First, it questioned whether the traditional justifications
for the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, applied in cases of
mental retardation." After all, with regard to retribution, the death
penalty is justified only in cases involving the most deserving of
criminals-those who have committed particularly heinous crimes where
there are no compelling mitigating factors to consider. 45 The Atkins
majority also questioned whether the prospect of the death penalty
would deter others with cognitive impairments which diminish impulse
control, the ability to plan, and the ability to weigh right from wrongmaybe not to the point where they would meet the insanity defense, but
the ability to engage in the sort of cold, calculated plan to commit a
heinous act.46
The Court's second concern was the potentially adverse impact of
mental retardation on the fairness of capital proceedings. 7
This
consideration is a particularly important part of the Atkins decision. The
Court cited the possibility of coercion, falseS confessions,
and the
41
potentially prejudicial impact of demeanor evidence. I will return to the
issue of demeanor evidence when I discuss mental illness and the lesser
ability of defendants with mental illness to make persuasive showings of
mitigation or to meaningfully assist their attorneys in making persuasive
showings of mitigation in capital cases.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 321.
Id. at 308 n.3, 317-21.
Id. at 318-20.
See id. at 319.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 306-07, 320-21.
Id. at 320-21.
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Currently, the Court has an aversion to judicial activism, particularly
when it comes to issues concerning civil rights. 49 But the Court's decision
in Atkins seemed to be guided by the recognition that when it comes to
the death penalty, there is no room for error.0 The Court's decision to
strike down the death penalty was certainly influenced heavily by the fact
that eighteen states had, in effect, provided it with cover.5' Eighteen
states have enacted statutes barring the execution of defendants with
mental retardation.52 There was a concerted, well-organized, nation-wide
effort engineered by a number of advocates for people with mental
retardation to systematically get these state statutes passed. To some
degree, this showed the Court a mounting wave of public opinion
recognizing that defendants with mental retardation should not be
executed. By contrast, only one state has barred the execution of people
with mental illness.53
According to the Death Penalty Information Center, there are
currently thirty-eight states that allow the death penalty. 4 In 2004, courts
in two of these states, New York Sand
Kansas, declared their death
- 55
penalty statutes to be unconstitutional.
Currently, no states that
recognize the death penalty prohibit the execution of people with mental
illness. Despite this fact, compelling arguments can be made advocating
that laws prohibiting execution of people with mental illness should exist.
The same concerns can be applied to people with mental illness as the
Court cited for people with mental retardation. Mental illness is
certainly quite different from mental retardation. Severe mental illnesses
do not necessarily result in diminished IQs, for example. They do not
necessarily decrease intelligence, although the cumulative effects of years
of a severe mental illness, particularly when untreated, can negatively
impact cognitive skills, such as memory, concentration, and
communications.

49. See Christopher P. Banks, Reversals of Precedent and Judicial Policy-Making:
How Judicial Conceptions of Stare Decisis in the US. Supreme Court Influence Social
Change, 32 AKRON L. REV. 233, 247 (1999).
50. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21.
51. Id. at 314-16.
52. Id.
53. Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental Illness, 33
N.M. L. REV. 293,297-98 (2003).
54.

DEATH

PENALTY

INFO.

CTR.,

STATE

BY

STATE

INFORMATION,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state (last visited May 18, 2005). The Death Penalty
Information Center is a wonderful resource for statistics, articles, and other information
about the death penalty.
55. People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 367 (N.Y. 2004); State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445,
459 (Kan. 2004)
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Let me pause at this point to briefly discuss what I mean by severe
mental illnesses. These are biologically based brain disorders. There is
clear evidence that the roots of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major
depression, and some other disorders are found in the complex
biochemistry of the brain.56 We do not really know what causes these
disorders and there are a lot of theories-some genetic, some viral, as
well as other theories-but none of these theories have been conclusively
proven yet. 7 There certainly appears to be a strong genetic component.5 8
Death penalty lawyers working with mentally ill defendants go to great
lengths to examine family history. Invariably these lawyers find that
others in the family had mental illnesses, perhaps the grandmother, or
several siblings, or cousins, or other relatives across multiple generations,
so there definitely appears to be a genetic link. There is great hope that
some of the genetic research taking place today will one day yield
significant discoveries about the root causes of severe mental illnesses
and how to effectively treat them.
The good news is that today, schizophrenia and other brain disorders
can be effectively treated. The bad news is that most people do not
have access to treatments. 60 Self-medication in the form of alcohol or
drug abuse is quite common among people with severe mental illnesses,6'
particularly among people who are caught up in the criminal justice
system. 61 Xavier Amador, a forensic psychologist, talks frequently about
a phenomenon known as Anasognosia. He has done a lot of research on
people with untreated schizophrenia who come through his clinic in New
York City and discovered that a significant percentage of those people
lack insight about their illnesses, do not think they are sick, and do not
think they need help.63 Certainly we can speculate about factors that
contribute to this, including the pervasive stigma that surrounds these
56. See MENTAL HEALTH CARE, CAUSES OF SCHIZOPHRENIA, http://www.mental
healthcare.org.uk/schizophrenia/causes (last updated Feb. 10, 2005).
57. See id.
58. See e.g., Laura Lee Hall, The Start of a Real Revolution: Genetics and Psychiatric
Illness, NAMI ADVOCATE, Summer/Fall 2003, at 28; see also Thomas R. Insel & Francis S.
Collins, Psychiatry in the Genornics Era, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 616, 617-18 (2003).
59. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
60. News Release, National Mental Health Association, People with Schizophrenia
and Caregivers Recognize, Speak Out About Barriers to Quality of Life (May 19, 2003),
http://www.nmha.org/newsroomi/system/news.vw.cfmdo=vw&rid=520.
61.

See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVS., NIH PUB. No. 02-3517,
SCHIZOPHRENIA 8 (1999), available at
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat[NIMHschizoph.pdf.
62. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 8, at 260.
63. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 61, at 23. Dr. Amador has
served as a consultant to the National Institute of Mental Health. See Biography, at
http://www.xavieramador.com (last visited June 19, 2005).
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illnesses. For a twenty-two-year-old diagnosed with schizophrenia, the
social connotations are devastating. There are many reasons why people
under these circumstances do not want to participate in treatment, but
Dr. Amador and others suggest that the research they have done
indicates that it is more than that- Anasognosia is actually a symptom of
the illness itself.6 Schizophrenia impacts the part of the brain that we use
to make judgments about our illnesses and our need for help.
Frequently I hear about individuals who take medications for years and
then stop medications and eventually relapse. At such times, when these
individuals need treatment the most, they may be least willing to
participate in treatment. And, they may be convinced that the profound
delusions and hallucinations they experience at such times are realityand that those who are trying to convince them to take their medications
are the ones who are sick.
It has also been suggested that alcohol and other substance abuse can
have a somewhat sedating and soothing effect on the profound symptoms
66
that people with severe mental illnesses experience. This may be one of
the reasons why there are such high rates of what we call comorbidity67
Individuals
co-occurring mental illness and substance use or abuse.
disproportionately
particularly
are
disorders
with co-occurring
represented in our nation's jails and prisons6.
There are two aspects of severe mental illnesses, particularly with
schizophrenia, which may impact personal culpability in criminal
behavior. The first is profound delusions or hallucinations that are
frequently experienced during periods of exacerbation of symptoms. For
example, individuals with schizophrenia may experience paranoid
delusions and auditory or visual hallucinations, so vivid and profound
that they appear real.6 9 At such times, they may be unable to distinguish
between delusions and reality and, therefore, act on their delusions,
7°
behaving in ways that seem bizarre and incomprehensible to others.
Although it is a virtually impossible task, we ask juries and judges to do
the impossible in cases where they are evaluating mental illness. They
are faced with the monumental task of passing judgment on the

64. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., NIH PUB. NO. 01-4599, WHEN SOMEONE HAS SCHIZOPHRENIA (2001),

http://www.nimh.nih.govlpublicat/schizsoms.cfm (last updated Oct. 14, 2004).
65. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 61, at 6, 23.
66. Id. at 8.
67. See Stephanie Hartwell, Triple Stigma: Persons with Mental Illness and Substance
Abuse Problems in the CriminalJustice System, 15 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 84, 87 (2004).

6&
69,
70.

See id. at 85.
See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 61, at 4-5.
Id.
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culpability of defendants who commit crimes while psychotic. They have
to impose logic on brain disorders that create illogical, confused patterns
of thought; a bright-line test between right and wrong does not work
when it comes to evaluating the dark, unbridled confusion and psychotic
delusions and hallucinations. There are other factors as well, even when
there are positive symptoms of schizophrenia and other severe mental
illnesses. There are also negative symptoms that often involve cognitive
deficits.
Studies have shown that the cognitive functions most
significantly impacted in schizophrenia include attention, abstract
thinking and problem solving, memory, verbal fluency and the ability to
perceive and respond effectively to social situations.71 It is very difficult
for someone who has not experienced psychosis first-hand to understand
it. Explaining this experience in an understandable way is a very difficult
challenge for defense attorneys and their experts.
Therefore, the application of the death penalty in cases involving
severe mental illnesses is highly problematic. Problems arise because of
the heightened risk of mistakes in these cases. Recent revelations of
mistakes in death penalty cases have led to the exoneration of more than
one hundred people on death row since 1973.72 Due to the growing
concern about mistakes in death penalty cases, some states have debated
the death penalty, 73 and Illinois went so far as to impose a moratorium on
the death penalty.7 4 Many states are reviewing their policy regarding the
death penalty in cases involving defendants with severe mental illnesses.75
The risk of a mistake is significantly increased by a combination of
factors, including diminished capacity of many defendants with these
illnesses, lack of knowledge and understanding on the part of
overburdened public defenders about how to raise mental illnesses
effectively in capital cases, and the fears of some prosecutors of being
labeled soft on crime. Prosecutors may, therefore, be loathe, particularly
in highly publicized cases like the Weston case, to take the death penalty
off the table as a consequence.
Traditional due process protections that one might assume would
lessen the risk of these errors are frequently lacking in cases involving
71.

See, e.g., id. at 2-3, 6-7.

72.

See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,

CASES

OF

INNOCENCE

1973-PRESENT,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=109 (last updated Mar. 15, 2005).
73. Sara Rimer, Support for a Moratorium in Executions Gets Stronger, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2000, at A18.
74. See Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory
Videotaping of InterrogationsIs the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions, 32
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 337, 381-83 (2001).
75. See RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., INNOCENCE AND THE
CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY (2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/

article.php?scid=45&did=1 149.
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mental illnesses. As a result, certain problems arise in these cases. The
first problem concerns the defendant's competency, which can arise both
during trial and after conviction. In criminal cases, a defense attorney is
frequently asked to represent individuals who, due to mental illness, may
not be cooperative or may not be fully able to participate in their own
defense. Although the Constitution requires that the defendant be
capable of participating knowingly in his or her own defense, 76
competency standards are quite low, often misunderstood, and unevenly
applied .
History abounds with defendants who were allowed to
represent themselves at trial despite serious questions about their
competency to do so.
One such example is the case of Scott Panetti in Texas. Panetti, a man
with a long history of paranoid schizophrenia, is currently on death row
in Texas] 8 He was within hours of being executed last year before a stay
was issued.7 9 Although serious questions existed about his competency to
stand trial, he was not only brought to trial, but was also allowed to
represent himself.80 At that trial, Panetti wore a cowboy outfit, sang
cowboy songs, asked irrational questions, cited biblical passages, engaged
in incoherent and confusing streams of consciousness, subpoenaed John
F. Kennedy and Jesus Christ, and was unable to mount an effective
8182
defense." It was a fiasco. Yet the judge never halted the proceedings.
The lawyers who had been representing him tried a variety of means to
bring his competency into question, which the court rebuffed.83
Ultimately, the jury in this case, having been faced with this spectacle,
must have been very confused. They deliberated for less than two hours,
found Panetti guilty, and recommended the death penalty, which was
subsequently ordered by the judge. 4 Last year, Panetti came within
hours of being executcd before a federal court interceded and issued a
stay because of questions about whether he was competent to be

76. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
77. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396-99, 402 (1993).
78. AMNESTY INT'L, AMR 51/01112004, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: "WHERE IS
THE COMPASSION'?" THE IMMINENT EXECUTION OF SCOTT PANETTI, MENTALLY ILL
OFFENDER 1 (2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR510112004
ENGLISHI$File/AMR5101104.pdf.
79. Panetti v. Dretke, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, at 3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2004) (order
denying petition for writ of habeas corpus and granting stay of execution).
80. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 78, at 5.
81. Id. at 5-9.
82. See id. at 1.
83. Id. at 5-7.
84. Id. at 10-11.
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executed, and whether he even understood the nature and finality of
death.85
Another case that illustrates this problem is that of Colin Ferguson, the
Long Island Railroad Shooter. 6
One of the people killed in his
unprovoked attack on the Long Island Railroad was the husband of
Congresswoman Carolyn McCarthy, now a leading gun control advocate
in Congress. 117 Despite questions about his competence, Ferguson was
also allowed to fire his attorneys and represent himself in a way equally
bizarre to Panetti's display. One might think that in cases like this there
is no problem, that these defendants are going to be found incompetent
to stand trial and are not going to be allowed to represent themselves.
Unfortunately, this does not appear to be true.
A second problem involves defendants who forbid their attorneys from
presenting evidence of mental illness at trial.
It is common for
defendants with mental illnesses to deny that they are sick or need
treatment, resulting in a refusal to allow mental illness to be raised as a
defense or as a mitigating factor.
This hamstrings defense attorneys
because almost all states prohibit them from overriding the defendant's
wishes in such cases.9O
A third problem is juror prejudice based on the demeanor of the
defendant. For example, take somebody who commits a crime while in
the throes of psychosis, while not taking medication. They are heavily
medicated prior to trial in order to make them competent to stand trial.
They sit in court and do not act bizarrely. They may be very sedate,
because they are over-medicated, which may cause them to appear
remorseless. The jurors look at that person and say to themselves this
"S.O.B" does not deserve mercy. Not only did the defendant do this
horrible thing, but he does not even seem concerned about it. Yet, how
can jurors evaluate what a defendant's state of mind was like at the time
of the crime when they are faced with somebody, perhaps three or four
years later, who may be in a very different state because he has been
medicated? It is a real problem.
A related issue is the involuntary medication of a defendant to make
him competent to stand trial in capital cases. Medicating a defendant in
85.
86.

See supra note 79.
See Francis X. Clines, Gunman in a Train Aisle Passes Out Death, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 9, 1993, at Al.
87. Kimberly A.C. Wilson, Md. Lawmakers Hear Gun-Ban Testimony, BALT. SUN,
Feb. 11, 2004, at B1.
88. Sylvia Adcock, Advisors on a Runaway Train, NEWSDAY (New York, N.Y.), Jan.
31, 1995, at A23, 1995 WLNR 485472.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1111-13 (9th Cir. 2001).
90. See State v. Bean, 762 A.2d 1259, 1267 (Vt. 2000).
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order to make him or her competent to be executed has been a real
controversy in this country over the last few years. In Sell v. United
States,9' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether it is
appropriate to involuntarily medicate people for purposes of bringing
92
them to trial-the Court said yes, under certain circumstances.
Actually, the Court seemed less comfortable with the idea that
involuntarily medicating a defendant is justified for purposes of
proceeding to trial but felt that it may be more justified when in the
interest of treatment. 93 It is hard to argue with the decision because it
was grounded in treatment concerns.
More of a problem is the ludicrous notion that somebody should be
medicated to make him or her competent to be executed. Ironically,
states frequently go to great lengths to try to medicate people who do not
understand the nature and finality of execution, so that states can make
them sufficiently competent for execution. At the same time, there is
frequently very little effort to treat these people before they commit the
crimes.
Another problem is the proliferation of cases around the country
involving defendants with mental illnesses who basically say they do not
want to be defended at trial or appeal their conviction; they want to be
executed. Is this irrational on their part? Often the pain of living with a
severe mental illness is so profound that death may seem like a better
alternative for some of these individuals. Moreover, the conditions that
94
these people face in prison contribute to this conclusion. Pike v. State is
an example of a case where the defendant waived her post-conviction
appeal. 95 The defendant, a woman with bipolar disorder, had been in
solitary confinement for at least a year and a half and had not been
receiving effective treatment for her bipolar disorder. 9 It is likely that
she perceived death as a better alternative to the hell she was living in.
Strikingly, these defendants frequently and almost invariably change
97
their minds about appeal once they are medicated and stabilized. This
is another major problem that contributes to the difficulty of fairly
adjudicating these cases.
A final issue of concern to NAMI is the use of "dueling experts" in our
adversarial system. The Andrea Yates case is a good illustration of this
91.
92.
93.
94.
2004).
95.
96.
97.

539 U.S. 166 (2003).
Id. at 169.
Id. at 179-83.
No. E2002-00766-CCA-R3-PD, 2004 WL 1580503 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15,
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1-6.
E.g., id. at *12.
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problem. 9 In this case, the defense had nine psychiatrists and two
psychologists take the stand and testify about how profoundly disabled
Yates was, and how her delusions were so powerful that she was
powerless to stop them.99 On the prosecution's side was Dr. Park Dietz, a
well-known psychiatric expert, who has made a living by providing expert
testimony for the prosecution. In this case, the jury found Yates guilty
of killing her two children."" A state court of appeals later declared a
mistrial, finding that Dr. Dietz had likely persuaded the jury with false
testimony."'2
My purpose here is not to attack Dr. Deitz or experts for the
prosecution; my point is a bigger one. How can we ask a jury faced with
complex and difficult questions-questions that psychiatrists can't agree
on-to make judgments about the sanity of the defendants, let alone
about the degree of their culpability? We are asking jurors to do the
impossible. One potential solution is to do away with the adversarial
expert system and have courts appoint experts. Even this is not a one
hundred percent foolproof solution. There is no guarantee that courtappointed experts are truly going to be experts or qualified to function as
such. But this is nevertheless an alternative to consider.
A final point concerns the proposed American Bar Association (ABA)
formulation. Ideally, the members of NAMI would like to see a per se
prohibition on executing people with mental illness. However, as a
practical and political matter, this would be a difficult sell no matter how
one defines mental illness. If we define mental illness diagnostically in a
narrow way with just five or six discrete diagnoses, we would be underinclusive. This would exclude some people who may not fit within the
specified diagnostic categories, but who nevertheless may be profoundly
disabled. One example is borderline personality disorder, an Axis II
diagnosis that is profoundly disabling and can be every bit as disabling as
schizophrenia.'03 The other extreme would be an approach that includes
every diagnosis listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders.1°4 This would most likely be over-inclusive, as it would apply
to hundreds of diagnostic categories.
98. Yates v. State, Nos. 01-02-00462-CR, 01-02-00463-CR, 2005 WL 20416 (Tex. App.
Jan.6, 2005).
99. Id. at *3.
100. Id.

101.

Id. at *1.

102.

Id. at *7.

103.

See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVS., NIH PUB. NO. 01-4928, BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 1 (2001),
availableat http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/NIMHbpd.pdf.
104.

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS (text rev. 4th ed. 2000).
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The ABA Task Force has done a very good job of trying to wade
through these very tricky shoals and come up with a formulation that is
both sensible, given the current state of knowledge, and politically viable.
This task will not be easy and it will take many years. We are going to
have to engage in a systematic effort state-by-state to get legislation
passed. Certainly we are not expecting a Supreme Court decision any
time soon. Perhaps there will be a favorable federal district court or
appellate court decision, or maybe even a state court decision. Maybe
after we persuade a significant number states to prohibit the execution of
people with mental illnesses we will have a better chance. It is going to
take a long time, but we are well on the way. Our country's views
regarding the death penalty may be turning. Concerns that we may be
executing large numbers of people on faulty evidence are going to help
us with this effort. I really appreciate all the great help we are getting
from some of the leading scholars in this field, including the members of
this panel. I appreciate your attention and hope that you will delve
further into these disturbing yet fascinating issues.
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